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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V 
V . 
DERALD ROSS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 940528-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for receiving or transferring a stolen motor 
vehicle, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-
1316(2)(1993). This Court has original appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). [ 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether this Court should refuse to review the merits of defendant's appeal 
because he has not adequately marshaled the evidence, failing to list the evidence in 
support of the jury's verdict and presenting the facts in a one-sided manner? 
Because this issue was not before the district court, no standard of review is 
appropriate. Nevertheless, State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah 1991) will assist 
the Court in detennining whether defendant's brief meets the marshaling rule. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
41-la-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer - Penalty. 
It is a second degree felony for a person: 
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or 
unlawfully taken if he is not a peace officer engaged at the time in the 
performance of his duty. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural history 
After the State rested its case, defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the 
grounds that the evidence did not prove, as a matter of law, that the stolen car did not 
belong to defendant (R. 59-64). The trial court denied the motion, ruling that whether 
defendant knew or should have known the car was not his was a question for the jury 
(R. 291). The jury convicted defendant of a second-degree felony for possessing a 
stolen vehicle (R. 129). The trial court sentenced him to serve an indeterminate term 
of zero- to fifteen-years at the Utah State Prison (R. 143). 
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Statement of facts 
In October 1992, defendant took out a loan for $250 from Quick Loan (R. 214). 
As collateral, defendant gave Quick Loan the title to his 1977 Dodge Charger (R. 325). 
Defendant admitted that he made no payments on the loan (R. 334). The security 
agreement states: "When you [defendant] are in default, lender can take possession of 
the collateral without judicial process and advance notice. . . .Lender can exercise all 
the rights, privileges and remedies of a secured party under Part 5 of Section 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code" (Security agreement, State's Exhibit Number three, 
addendum B). 
In November 1992, defendant gave the car to Glen Burns to store at his home in 
Stockton, Utah (R. 263). Sometime in April 1992, defendant told Burns that Quick 
Loan was looking for the car and asked Burns to say he did not know anything about it 
if Quick Loan called (R. 265). Instead, Burns called Quick Loan and the company 
came out, inspected the car, and took possession (id.V Three days later, Burns told 
defendant that Quick Loan had taken the car (R. 266). Less than a month later, Quick 
Loan sold the car to the highest bidder, J&K Automotive, for $75 (R. 226). J&K 
Automotive took possession of the car on May 4, 1992 and parked the car outside its 
fenced lot on Main Street at approximately 40th South in Salt Lake County (R. 239). 
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On approximately May 9, defendant was driving down Main Street and noticed 
the Dodge Charger parked at approximately 40th South (R. 304). Defendant parked 
the car he was driving and took the Dodge Charger to a trailer park where his father 
lived in Sandy, Utah (R. 305). On May 10, 1992, Craig Pavich, an employee for J&K 
noticed that the car was missing and reported it to the police (R. 241). In August, 
defendant took the car to Ron Ison so he could take out its motor and place it into a 
motor home (R. 270-71). While the car was at Mr. Ison's, defendant also came and 
took the transmission (R. 271). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's selective presentation of the evidence does not satisfy the essential 
requirement to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's verdict. He leaves out 
evidence that shows defendant was told Quick Loan had repossessed the vehicle almost 
a month before defendant took it from its parking place on 40th south and Main Street 
in Salt Lake County. This testimony establishes that defendant knew or had reason to 
believe that he car had taken the car unlawfully, a vital element of the statute the jury 
found defendant violated. Because defendant did not marshal the evidence, the court 
should not review the sufficiency argument on the merits. 
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ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT PROPERLY MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT, THIS 
COURT SHOULD NOT ENTERTAIN DEFENDANT'S 
ARGUMENTS ON THE MERITS. 
Marshaling is an essential predicate to a successful challenge to a jury verdict. 
State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah 1991). It is the first of a two-part analysis in 
a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. The defendant must first list all the evidence 
that supports the jury's verdict. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 
1993). The defendant must then establish that, even when viewed in its most favorable 
light, the marshaled evidence does not support the verdict. McPherson v. Belnap. 830 
P.2d 302, 305 (Utah App. 1992). 
Defendant's brief recites evidence, but the evidence is selective, including only 
those portions that cast doubt on the verdict and support the defendant's theory of the 
case. This is not marshaling. Scheel. 823 P.2d at 473 (defendant's brief recounts the 
facts most favorable to defendant while ignoring lengthy testimony that supports the 
verdict). In Scheel. this Court refused to reach the merits of defendant's sufficiency 
argument because defendant emphasized only favorable evidence, while leaving to the 
appellate court the obligation to ferret out supporting evidence. LL (citing Heinecke v. 
Department of Commerce. 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App. 1991). 
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Here, defendant's brief gives a similarly one-sided presentation of the evidence. 
Of vital importance to the verdict is Glen Burns's testimony that defendant told Burns 
that Quick Loan was looking for the car and asked for Burns to say nothing about it to 
Quick Loan (R. 265). Also, Burns' statement that he told defendant Quick Loan 
repossessed the car sometime in April 1993 (R. 265) supports the jury's finding that 
defendant knew or had reason to believe that the car was no longer his (R. 266). Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1993). Yet, defendant's brief nowhere mentions these 
pieces of evidence. Instead, defendant's recitation of facts and argument focuses 
exclusively on the false issue of the ten-day notice of sale.1 This issue is irrelevant to 
the basic question under the statute whether defendant knew or had reason to believe 
that someone else had the "legal right to possession of the vehicle," thus, making 
defendant's taking of the car unlawful. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1001 (1993) 
(definition of owner of a motor vehicle). 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a secured creditor becomes the legal 
successor in interest to the owner when the owner defaults on his security agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-503 (1990); Cheyenne Mountain Bank v. Whetstone Corp.. 
787 P.2d 210, 212 (Colo. App. 1990) (basing decision on Colorado equivalent to 
1
 Defendant's claim that he maintained his ownership interest in the car because of Quick 
Loan's purported failure to give him ten-days notice of the sale is misplaced. The notice of sale does 
not affect Quick Loan's possessory interest but may have civil consequences to Quick Loan's ability to 
obtain a deficiency judgment. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) (1990); Wang v. Wang. 440 N.W.2d 
740, 742-43 (S.D. 1989). Transfer of possession, and, therefore, ownership, occurs with repossession 
of the secured property. Cf Cheyenne Mountain Bank. 787 P.2d at 212. 
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section 70A-9-503). Thus, when Quick Loan repossessed the 1977 Dodge Charger, it 
became the owner, i.e., had the legal right of possession (Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-
1001 (1993)) and defendant was no longer allowed to take the car or dispose of it. 
Burns' testimony, therefore, establishes not just this essential ownership question, but 
also that defendant knew of the repossession and consequent transfer in ownership 
approximately one month before he took the car and began selling its components (R. 
305). Additionally, under the UCC, once Quick Loan sold the car to J&K, all 
defendant's rights passed to J&K and he had no right to take the car. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-9-504(4) (1993) (disposition after default transfers all debtor's rights to 
purchaser). Whether defendant received notice within nine days or ten days is 
irrelevant to this legal proposition. A technical default in notification of the sale only 
gave defendant a potential defense in a later deficiency action; it would not renew his 
ownership or possessory interest. £e£ Wang. 440 N.W.2d at 742-43 (failure to give 
notification within proper time limits creates a rebuttable presumption that sale 
constituted full payment of the debt). 
Defendant's brief presents only an abbreviated and biased version of the facts to 
this Court, leaving out vital evidence that radically changes the analysis and justifies the 
jury verdict. Because of this failure to marshal the evidence, this Court should refuse 
to review the merits of defendant's sufficiency claim and affirm the conviction. Scheel. 
823 P.2d at 473. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because the briefs adequately state the facts and legal arguments, oral argument 
is not necessary to explain the legal or factual issues. Further, this case does not 
involve an area of law that needs development or clarification; therefore, the State does 
not request a published opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS H f d a y of July 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL JT < 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Lender: QUICK LOAN SALT LAKE CITY, UT 8.* 115 
Borrower: DERALD ROSS 
Collateral: 77 DODGE CHARGER SE 
Loan Number 
Customer ID 
10287 
100312 
Grace Period: 10 Days 
Annual 
P«rc+ntapg Rata 
The cost of 
your credit as 
a yearly rate 
45.00 
Finance 
Charge 
The dollar 
amount the 
credit will cost 
you. 
232.50 
Amount 
Financed 
The amount of 
credit provided 
to you or on 
your behalf 
265.00 
The amount you 
will have paid 
after you have 
made ail 
payments as 
scheduled 
497.50 
financing Disclosure 
njotal of Payments: -497.50 
Orig. Fee: 205.24 
Doc. Fee: 10.00 
finance Chg: 17.26 
Your Payment Schedule Will Be: 
EN 
Payments of $49.75 each 
rery 14 days beginning Friday 11/13/92 
Fee... $15.00 Late 
Tjotal Finance Chg: 
Bees t o Others 
-232.50 
Notary Fee: 
a i l i n g Fee: 
5 .00 
10.00 
'dotal Fees t o Others; 
Qheck t o borrower: 
15.00 
250.00 
If paid off early you may be entitled to a partial refund of finance charges 
PROMISORY NOTE 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of the above lender at the above address or at 
such other place as the holder hereof may designate, the Amount Financed above together with prepaid finance charges and interest 
from the date hereof at the above Note Rate per annum on unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as set forth in the above 
payment schedule. 
The undersigned jointly and severally further promise to pay a delinquency charge of the GREATER OF FIVE PERCENT OR FIFTEEN 
DOLLARS of any interest or principal payment which has remained unpaid for more that the grace period stated above. 
Each payment shall be applied first to any late penalties due, next to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. If 
default occurs in the payment of any said installment of principal and/or interest or any part thereof, accrued interest shall be 
compounded monthly on the first day of each month and thereafter shall be added to the principal. Said compounded interest and 
remaining principal balance shall bear interest at the default rate stated above. 
•In the event of an early payoff, the origination fee and the finance charge shall be refunded to the undersigned on a pro-rata basis. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and/or interest or in any part thereof, or in the performance of any 
agreement contained in the security agreement or in this Note, the holder hereof, at its option and without notice or demand, may declare 
the entire principal balance and accured interest due and payable. 
W this note is collected by an attorney after default, either with or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs 
and expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee. The undersigned further agree to pay any costs and attorney's fees 
incurred by the holder hereof in any bankruptcy-related proceeding including the seeking of relief from the automatic stay. Any such 
costs and attorney's fees shall be added to the unpaid Note balance and shall be secured by the security agreement. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment tor payment, demand and notice of dishonor and 
nonpayment of this Note, and consent to any and all extension of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be granted by the 
holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this Note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or 
without substitution. 
Interest will accrue at the default rate on any judgment amount awarded to the payee hereof in connection with any default hereunder. 
All returned checks will be subject to a fifteen dollar fee. 
SECURITY AGREEMENT 
This note is secured by the herein mentioned collateral. You agree to give fender a security interest in this collateral. Any additions or 
accessions to the collateral are part of the lender's collateral. While any part of this loan remains unpaid, you agree to use the collateral 
carefully and keep it in good repair, obtain written permission from lender before making major alterations, inform lender in writing before 
changing your address or the address where the collateral is kept help lender enforce and protect the security interest you have given in 
the collateral, not use the collateral for any unlawful purposes, and allow lender or its agent to examine and inspect the collateral at 
reasonable times. You further promise to keep the collateral insured and to pay any taxes due on the collateral. 
You will be in default if you break any promise you made under this note or security agreement if at any time, any requirements to obtain 
this loan are violated, the lender may deem itself insecure and declare default The lender may, at its option, demand immediate payment 
of the unpaid balance of the loan if you are in default When you are in default lender can take possession of the collateral without judicial 
process and advance notice. If in default you agree to deliver the collateral to lender at a time and place lender chooses. Lender can 
exercise all the rights, privileges and remedies of a secured party under Part 5 of Section 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Lender will 
not be responsible for any of your property not covered by this agreement that you leave inside or attached to the collateral. Lender will try 
to return that property to you. After lender has taken possession of the collateral, lender can sell it and apply the proceeds of the sale to the 
unpaid balance of the loan. Lender will give you at least ten (10) days' notice of any public sale or the date after which lender will agree to 
have a private sale. The costs lender incurs in taking possession of and selling the collateral will be deducted from the money received 
from the sale. Lender will apply the rest of the money received to the balance of the loan. If any amounts remain unpaid after the sale, you 
will still be liable for the balance. Lender can delay enforcing any of its rights under this agreement any number of times without losing 
them. Lender can enforce this agreement against your heirs and legal representatives. If lender changes the terms of the promissory notg^ 
you agree that this security interest will continue to protect lender. 
ADDENDUM B 
70A-9-503. Secured party's right to take possession after default. 
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the 
collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can 
be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so 
provides the secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available 
to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably 
convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment unusable, and 
may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under Section 70A-9-504. If a secured party 
elects to proceed by process of law he may proceed by writ of replevin or otherwise 
(c) 1953-1995 By The Michie Company 
70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after default - Effect of 
disposition. 
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the 
collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or 
processing. Any sale of goods is subject to the chapter on Sales (Chapter 2). The proceeds of 
disposition shall be applied in the order following to 
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale or lease, selling, leasing 
and the like and, to the extent provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by law, the 
reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party; 
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest under which the 
disposition is made; 
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security interest in the 
collateral if written notification of demand therefor is received before distribution of the proceeds 
is completed. If requested by the secured party, the holder of a subordinate security interest must 
seasonably furnish reasonable proof of his interest, and unless he does so, the secured party need 
not comply with his demand. 
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account to the 
debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if 
the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any 
surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the security agreement so provides. 
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be made 
by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at 
any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition including the method, 
manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable 
or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, 
reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the 
time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the 
secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or 
modifying his right to notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other notification 
need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any other secured party from whom the 
secured party has received (before sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's 
renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral. The secured 
party may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized 
market or is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations he may 
buy at private sale. 
(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the disposition transfers to 
a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges the security interest under 
which it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto. The purchaser takes free of 
all such rights and interests even though the secured party fails to comply with the requirements 
of this part or of any judicial proceedings 
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge of any defects in the sale 
and if he does not buy in collusion with the secured party, other bidders or the person conducting 
the sale; or 
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith. 
(5) A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, indorsement, repurchase 
agreement or the like and who receives a transfer of collateral from the secured party or is 
subrogated to his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the secured party. Such a transfer 
of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the collateral under this chapter 
(c) 1953-1995 By The Michie Company 
70A-9-507. Secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part. 
(1) If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the 
provisions of this part disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and 
conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor or any person entitled to notification or 
whose security interest has been made known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a 
right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions 
of this part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover in any event an 
amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the 
debt or the time price differential plus ten per cent of the cash price. 
(2) The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a 
different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that 
the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the 
collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price current 
in such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable 
commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in a commercially 
reasonable manner. The principles stated in the two preceding sentences with respect to sales also 
apply as may be appropriate to other types of disposition. A disposition which has been approved 
in any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or representative of creditors 
shall conclusively be deemed to be commercially reasonable, but this sentence does not indicate 
that any such approval must be obtained in any case nor does it indicate that any disposition not 
so approved is not commercially reasonable. 
(c) 1953-1995 By The Michic Company 
ADDENDUM C 
787 P.2d 210 
11 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 64 
(Cite as: 787 P.2d 210) 
Page 1 
CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN BANK, Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
v. 
WHETSTONE CORPORATION, Defendant-
Appellee. 
No. 88CA1326. 
Colorado Court of Appeals, 
Div. III. 
Jan. 11, 1990. 
After repossessing collateral from buyer upon 
default on note, bank brought suit against seller of 
collateral, alleging breach of warranty, breach of 
contract and misrepresentation. Seller moved for 
summary judgment. The District Court, El Paso 
County, James Franklin, J., entered summary 
judgment in seller's favor, on ground that bank 
failed to give notice of breach as required by UCC. 
Bank appealed. The Court of Appeals, Marquez, J., 
held that: (1) bank, as secured party that 
repossessed collateral upon buyer's default, was 
"legal successor in interest" to buyer and thus met 
definition of "buyer" in UCC; (2) bank could seek 
recovery as third-party beneficiary of seller's 
warranties; (3) indirect notice of warranty claim 
received by seller before bank disposed of collateral 
was sufficient to raise fact issue as to whether bank's 
delay in giving formal notice of claimed defects 
until after disposition of collateral was 
unreasonable; and (4) trial court prematurely 
dismissed misrepresentation claim. 
Reversed and remanded. 
[1] SECURED TRANSACTIONS <&* 111 
349Ak221 
Secured creditor, after default by debtor, holds 
inchoate possessory interest in disposition of 
property. C.R.S. 4-2-103(l)(a), 4-2-103 comment. 
[2] SECURED TRANSACTIONS &* 228 
349Ak228 
Secured creditor, once it repossesses collateral, 
becomes "legal successor in interest" to its debtor, 
the initial buyer, and therefore also becomes a 
"buyer" under UCC for purposes of requirements 
for asserting warranty claim. C.R.S. 4-2-103(l)(a). 
[3] SALES <$=* 255 
343k255 
Bank which repossessed collateral as secured 
creditor after its debtor, the initial buyer, defaulted, 
became buyer's legal successor, and thus "buyer" 
within definition of UCC, and was accordingly 
entitled to seek recovery as third-party beneficiary 
of seller's warranties concerning collateral. C.R.S. 
4-2-103(l)(a). 
[4] SALES <&* 285(1) 
343k285(l) 
Requirement that buyer notify seller of breach of 
warranty within reasonable time serves three 
purposes-it provides seller with opportunity to 
correct any defects, to prepare for negotiation and 
litigation, and to protect itself against stale claims 
asserted after it is too late for seller to investigate 
them. C.R.S. 4-2-607(3)(a). 
[5] SALES <§=> 445(5) 
343k445(5) 
Whether notice given by buyer to seller of claimed 
breach of warranty is satisfactory and whether it is 
given within reasonable time are generally questions 
of fact to be measured by all circumstances of case. 
C.R.S. 4-2-607(3)(a). 
[6] SALES <§=> 285(3) 
343k285(3) 
Bank's failure to give direct notice to seller of 
claimed breach of warranties concerning repossessed 
collateral did not render bank's post-disposition 
notice unreasonable as matter of law, where prior to 
bank's sale of collateral, potential purchaser had 
notified seller of claimed defects in collateral; 
indirect notice served all purposes of notification 
requirement and raised fact issue as to 
reasonableness, since seller had opportunity to 
correct defects before bank's resale, opportunity to 
investigate claimed defects, opportunity to prepare 
for negotiations with bank and to protect itself 
against stale claim. C.R.S. 4-2-607(3)(a). 
[7] SALES € » 285(1) 
343k285(l) 
In instances in which seller may have indirect notice 
of claim of breach of warranty before buyer disposes 
of property, it cannot be said, as matter of law, that 
not formerly notifying seller of defects until after 
disposition is necessarily "unreasonable." C.R.S. 4-
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2-607(3)(a). 
[8] JUDGMENT <§=> 186 
228kl86 
Trial court erred in dismissing misrepresentation 
claim, which admittedly failed to state cause of 
action, without allowing plaintiff to depose 
defendant's president prior to hearing on summary 
judgment motion, where plaintiff had had notice of 
deposition at least one month prior to hearing; 
conceivably, after deposition, misrepresentation 
claim could have been amended to state claim upon 
which relief could be granted. 
*211 Joseph M. Ricci, P.C., Joseph M. Ricci and 
Terrence T. McGannon, Colorado Springs, for 
plaintiff-appellant. 
Holme Roberts & Owen, James T. Flynn and 
Walter H. Sargent, Colorado Springs, for defendant-
appellee. 
Opinion by Judge MARQUEZ. 
Cheyenne Mountain Bank (Bank) appeals from the 
summary judgment dismissing its claims for 
breaches of warranties, breach of contract, and 
misrepresentation against Whetstone Corporation. 
We reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
The Bank received a security interest from 
Hawaiian Macadamia of Maui, Ltd., in a candy-
making machine manufactured and sold by 
Whetstone to Hawaiian. When Hawaiian defaulted, 
the Bank repossessed the machine and eventually 
sold it to Wes Niswonger for substantially less than 
the amount due on the note. Hawaiian having filed 
bankruptcy, the Bank was left with only Whetstone 
to recoup the deficiency. 
After selling the machine to Niswonger, the Bank 
wrote to Whetstone describing the problems with the 
machine and claiming that there were breaches of 
warranties. The Bank later brought this action 
against Whetstone, alleging that the various defects 
in the machine constituted breaches of warranties, 
breach of contract, and misrepresentations. The 
Bank further asserted that it had standing to pursue 
these claims as a third-party beneficiary of 
Whetstone's warranties under § 4-2-318, C.R.S. 
In response to Whetstone's motion for summary 
judgment, the Bank submitted an affidavit from 
Niswonger. In that affidavit, Niswonger described 
the problems with the machine which he claims to 
have discussed with Whetstone prior to purchasing 
the machine from the Bank. 
Before the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court issued a protective order 
staying the Bank's deposition of Whetstone's 
president until the motion *212 for summary 
judgment was decided. At the summary judgment 
hearing, the Bank made an offer of proof that 
Niswonger had acted as its agent in contacting 
Whetstone about defects in the machine and argued 
that this satisfied any required notice to Whetstone. 
The trial court dismissed all claims, and this appeal 
followed. 
I. 
The Bank contends the trial court erred in ruling, 
as a matter of law, that the Bank failed to give 
notice of breach as required by § 4-2-607(3)(a), 
C.R.S. We agree. 
In granting summary judgment, the court relied on 
White v. Mississippi Order Buyers, Inc., 648 P.2d 
682 (Colo.App. 1982), ruling that the time which 
had elapsed before the Bank gave Whetstone notice 
of the warranty claim was unreasonable. We 
conclude that such a determination on a summary 
judgment motion was error. However, before 
addressing the timeliness of the notice, we consider 
whether the Bank was even required to give notice 
to Whetstone of the alleged breaches. 
Section 4-2-607(3)(a), C.R.S., requires a "buyer" 
to notify the seller within a reasonable time of any 
breach of warranty. Failure to so notify the seller 
precludes a remedy to the "buyer." Section 4-2-
607(3)(a), C.R.S.; Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 
684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984). 
A "buyer" means a person who buys or contracts 
to buy goods. Section 4-2-103(l)(a), C.R.S. 
Certainly, at the time a security agreement is 
executed, a secured party neither buys nor contracts 
to buy goods, but rather holds only a lien on that 
property. However, in every ordinary case, the 
definition of "buyer" also includes "any legal 
successor in interest" to the buyer. Section 4-2-103, 
C.R.S. (Official Comment 1). 
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[1] Generally, a "successor in interest" is one who 
follows another in ownership or control of property. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1283 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). 
A secured creditor, after default by the debtor, holds 
an inchoate possessory interest in the disposition of 
the property. See People ex rel. VanMeveren v. 
District Court, 619 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1980). The 
Bank followed Hawaiian in control over the 
equipment after it repossessed the machine and in 
fact acknowledges that it succeeded to all interests 
and rights to the equipment and that it was the 
"assignee of the warranties of the buyer." 
[2] We reject the bank's contention that a third-
party beneficiary, by its inherent definition, cannot 
also be a "buyer." See Western Equipment Co., 
Inc. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806 
(Wyo.1980) (definition of "buyer" includes "any 
person who may reasonably be expected to use, 
consume, or be affected by goods," and a remote 
"buyer" may sue manufacturer for economic loss 
caused by breach of warranty). 
Accordingly, we hold that a secured creditor, once 
it repossesses the collateral, becomes a "legal 
successor in interest" to its debtor, the initial buyer, 
and therefore also becomes a "buyer" within the 
meaning of § 4-2-103(l)(a). But see Johnson v. 
General Motors Corp., 349 Pa.Super. 147, 502 
A.2d 1317 (1986) (holding that the heir of a buyer 
is not a legal successor in interest to the buyer and 
therefore cannot qualify as a "buyer" under the 
U.C.C.). 
[3] In addition, since the Bank is a "buyer," the 
trial court properly ruled, on the undisputed facts, 
that the Bank could seek recovery as a third-party 
beneficiary of Whetstone's warranties. See Western 
Equipment Co., Inc., supra. 
Accordingly, § 4-2-607(3)(a), C.R.S., required 
the Bank to notify Whetstone within a reasonable 
time of the breach of warranty. However, the trial 
court here erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that 
the time that elapsed before the bank gave notice 
was unreasonable under White, supra. 
The procedural context of this case is materially 
different from White. There, after a bench trial, the 
court determined as a factual matter that notice was 
not given within a reasonable time. We affirmed 
that factual finding since the buyer did not notify his 
seller of the breach before he resold the goods. 
•213 By contrast, here, the trial court granted 
Whetstone's motion for summary judgment when 
the factual resolution of whether notification was 
made within a reasonable time was still in dispute. 
[4] The notice requirement of § 4-2-607(3)(a), 
C.R.S. serves three purposes: it provides the seller 
with an opportunity to correct any defect, to prepare 
for negotiation and litigation, and to protect itself 
against stale claims asserted after it is too late for the 
seller to investigate them. Prutch v. Ford Motor 
Co., 618 P.2d 657 (Colo.1980). And, the buyer's 
disposition of the subject property before notifying 
the seller of the breach frustrates these purposes. 
White, supra. 
[5] Whether the notice given is satisfactory and 
whether it is given within a reasonable time are 
generally questions of fact to be measured by all the 
circumstances of the case. White, supra; Western 
Conference Resorts, Inc. v. Pease, 668 P.2d 973 
(Colo.App. 1983). But see Myers v. Koop, 757 
P.2d 162 (Colo.App. 1988). 
[6] Here, Niswonger's affidavit notes that prior to 
his purchase, he contacted and informed Whetstone 
of certain problems with the machine. The affidavit 
further states that on several occasions prior to the 
Bank's sale of the machine to Niswonger, Whetstone 
actually attempted to fix the problems. The trier of 
fact could consider these statements, along with the 
Bank's post-disposition notice, and conclude that 
Whetstone, regardless of whether Niswonger was 
the bank's agent, had actual notice and that such 
notice was given within a reasonable time. 
If the affidavit's assertions are accepted as true, 
then all of the purposes of the notification 
requirement would be satisfied. That is, Whetstone 
had the opportunity to correct the defects before the 
Bank's resale, and in fact attempted to do just that. 
Further, Whetstone was given the opportunity to 
investigate the claimed defects before the Bank's 
disposition. Finally, Whetstone's knowledge of the 
problems afforded it the chance to prepare for 
negotiations with the Bank. When the purposes of 
the notice requirement have been fully served by 
actual notice, the notice provision should not 
operate as a technical procedural barrier to deny 
claimants the opportunity to litigate the case on the 
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[7] In the circumstances at issue in which the 
seller may have indirect notice of a claim before the 
buyer disposes of the property, we cannot say, as a 
matter of law, that formally notifying the seller of 
defects after that disposition is necessarily 
"unreasonable." The trier of fact will have to make 
such a determination. See White, supra. 
II. 
[8] The Bank also challenges the dismissal of its 
misrepresentation claim. We agree that dismissal 
was improper. 
The Bank's amended complaint fails to allege that 
Whetstone made any representations with knowledge 
of, or an utter disregard as to, their falsity. 
However, the trial court did not allow the Bank to 
depose Whetstone prior to the hearing on summary 
judgment even though notice of deposition was 
provided at least one month prior to that hearing, 
and the expense to Whetstone would have been 
minimal. Conceivably, after such deposition, the 
misrepresentation claim could have been amended to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause is 
remanded for further proceedings. 
STERNBERG and CRISWELL, JJ., concur. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. ° West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works 
ADDENDUM D 
440 N.W.2d 740 
8 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1262 
(Cite as: 440 N.W.2d 740) 
Page 1 
Robert L. WANG, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Victor J. WANG and Albert Schramm, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
16058. 
Supreme Court of South Dakota. 
Submitted on Briefs Nov. 30, 1988. 
Decided May 3, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied June 9, 1989. 
Assignee appealed from judgment on jury verdict 
for cosigner of note in assignee's suit to recover 
deficiency judgment. The Supreme Court, 393 
N.W.2d 771, reversed and remanded. On remand, 
the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, Tripp County, 
James W. Anderson, J., entered judgment on jury 
verdict in favor of assignee. Cosigner appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Morgan, J., held that: (1) 
under "Arkansas rule," assignee's failure to give 
cosigner requisite notice of dispositional sale of 
collateral did not preclude recovery of deficiency 
judgment; (2) jury verdict would not be overturned 
on ground that sale of collateral was not 
commercially reasonable; and (3) assignee 
constructively elected remedy of strict foreclosure 
and was thereby barred from recovering deficiency 
judgment. 
Reversed and remanded with instructions. 
[1] SECURED TRANSACTIONS <S=> 240 
349Ak240 
Guarantors, accommodation parties, and other 
obligors who owe collateral duty to pay deficiencies 
are "debtors" within meaning of Article 9 of 
Uniform Commercial Code. SDCL 57A-9-101 et 
seq.; U.CC. § 9-105(l)(d). 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
[2] SECURED TRANSACTIONS <S^ 240 
349Ak240 
South Dakota follows "Arkansas rule" indulging 
rebuttable presumption that collateral was worth at 
least the amount of debt, thereby shifting to creditor 
the burden of proving the amount that would 
reasonably have been obtained through sale 
conducted according to law. SDCL 57A-9-101 et 
seq.,57A-9-507(l). 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
[3] SECURED TRANSACTIONS <&=* 240 
349Ak240 
Assignee's failure to give cosigner of note the 
requisite notice of disposition of collateral did not 
bar deficiency judgment. SDCL 57A-9-504(3), 
57A-9-507(l). 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
[4] SECURED TRANSACTIONS <§=> 240 
349Ak240 
Failure to sell collateral in commercially reasonable 
manner does not necessarily preclude creditor from 
recovering deficiency. SDCL 57A-9-504(3), 57A-
9-507(1). 
[5] SECURED TRANSACTIONS G=> 240 
349Ak240 
General verdict in favor of assignee bringing suit 
against cosigner of note to recover deficiency 
judgment would not be overturned on ground that 
sale of collateral was commercially unreasonable; 
jury was instructed on language of applicable UCC 
provision and judicial checklist identifying 
distinguishing characteristics of acceptable auction 
sale, as well as its duty to find that cosigner's 
obligation to pay amount of note was discharged to 
extent sale proceeds were inadequate if it found that 
sale was not commercially reasonable and could 
have reached verdict under those instructions and 
allowed for inadequacies of sale procedure. SDCL 
57A-9-504(3). 
[6] SECURED TRANSACTIONS <&* 240 
349Ak240 
Assignee of note had, by his actions, constructively 
elected remedy of strict foreclosure and was thereby 
barred from recovering deficiency judgment; 
assignee took and maintained exclusive control and 
possession of collateral from time he purchased 
note, continuously held collateral on his property 
and told other signer not to remove it and stay away, 
did not file suit to collect on note until over one year 
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later, and did not undertake sale of collateral until 
four and one-half years after taking possession. 
SDCL57A-9-505(2). 
*741 Bryce A. Flint of Jackley & Flint, Sturgis, 
for plaintiff and appellee. 
Donald E. Covey of Covey Law Office, Winner, 
for defendant and appellant Schramm. 
MORGAN, Justice. 
Albert Schramm (Schramm), who co-signed a 
promissory note with Victor Wang (Victor) in favor 
of the Rosebud Credit Union, appeals from a 
judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of 
Robert Wang (Robert), assignee of the note, in 
Robert's suit to recover a deficiency judgment. We 
reverse and remand. 
This appeal comes before this court after reversal 
of an earlier decision in Schramm's favor and the 
retrial thereof. The initial decision and background 
information may be found at Wang v. Wang, 393 
N.W.2d 771 (S.D.1986) (Wang I). The substance 
of the decision was that Schramm was not a signer 
in a representative capacity and thus could be held 
liable to the assignee. 
In July 1980, when Robert received the 
promissory note and security agreement by 
assignment from the Rosebud Credit Union, he 
promptly notified Victor and took exclusive 
possession of the collateral that secured the note, 
which was stored on his property in Meade County. 
He told Victor that he was to stay away from the 
collateral. Robert maintained control over the 
collateral by keeping it on his private property, 
draining radiators, and protecting it from vandals. 
In September 1981, while retaining exclusive 
possession of the collateral, Robert commenced the 
lawsuit on the note, which culminated in Wang I. 
In December 1984, after the first trial and while the 
appeal therefrom was in process, Robert undertook 
the sale of the collateral. A notice of sale was 
published in the Mellette County News, White 
River, South Dakota, the county where the vehicles 
were titled but not where the collateral was located. 
No other notices were published. No sale bills were 
prepared or distributed. No notice was sent to 
Schramm. The notice of sale stated that the 
property would be sold on January 18, 1985, "at 
1915 Junction, Sturgis, South Dakota. The sale 
shall be held in Sturgis as the property is not in 
working condition and also too bulky to be 
transported/ The address given was Robert's 
residence and the notice did not state whether the 
property was available for inspection. 
The sale was conducted at Robert's kitchen table 
on the day and time set. Only Robert and his 
attorney were present. The collateral was not 
present at the place where the sale was to be 
conducted and was in fact located approximately 
five miles away. Robert, who conducted the sale, 
bid $100 for the property. 
After the foreclosure sale, Robert brought suit to 
recover a deficiency judgment, the genesis of this 
appeal. The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Robert in the amount of $42,900.00. On appeal, 
Schramm raises several claims of alleged error. 
Among others, he contends that the trial court erred 
by denying his motions for directed verdict and 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) on the 
grounds that: 
•742 (1) Robert had failed to give Schramm notice 
of the dispositional sale of the collateral; 
(2) The sale of the collateral was not a 
commercially reasonable sale; and 
(3) Robert had elected a remedy of strict 
foreclosure thereby barring a deficiency judgment. 
We agree with Schramm that Robert is barred from 
recovering a deficiency judgment under issue three. 
We first determine that, as to the issues under 
review, there is no dispute as to the facts. Thus, the 
appeal hinges entirely on the application of the law 
to those facts. The applicable law is found entirely 
within the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and 
more particularly in SDCL ch. 57A-9, Secured 
Transactions. To simplify matters, further 
references to the Code will be made by referring to 
its corresponding U.C.C. citation, 9-504(3) for 
example. 
We first choose to review the issue of failure to 
give Schramm notice of the public sale. There is no 
question that Robert did not send any notice of sale 
to Schramm. It is Robert's position that he was not 
required to do so because, while both Victor and 
Schramm were debtors on the note, only Victor was 
a debtor with regard to the collateral. In support of 
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this position, he cites us to 9-105(l)(d) which 
provides, in pertinent part: "Where the debtor and 
the owner of the collateral are not the same person, 
the term 'debtor' means the owner of the collateral 
in any provision of the chapter dealing with the 
collateral^]" He cites us to no case authority after 
the enactment of the U.C.C., in support of his 
position. 
[1] 9-504(3) requires that, absent certain 
conditions not relevant here, "reasonable 
notification of the time and place of any public sale 
... shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor if 
he has not signed after default a statement 
renouncing or modifying his right to notification of 
sale." A debtor is defined at 9-105(l)(d) as: 
'Debtor' means the person who owes payment or 
other performance of the obligation secured, 
whether or not he owns or has rights in the 
collateral, and includes the seller or accounts or 
chattel paper. Where the debtor and the owner of 
the collateral are not the same person, the term 
'debtor' means the owner of the collateral in any 
provision of the chapter dealing with the 
collateral, the obligor in any provision dealing 
with the obligation, and may include both where 
the context so requires[.] 
The majority of jurisdictions interpreting this 
provision have held that "guarantors, 
accommodation parties, and other obligors who owe 
a collateral duty to pay deficiencies are debtors 
within the meaning of Article 9 of the Code." Ford 
Motor Credit Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F.Supp. 996, 
1002 (E.D.Pa. 1982). 
We agree with the majority view. In Wang I, 
supra, we determined that Schramm was personally 
liable to Robert as a comaker of the note but made 
no determination as to his accommodation character. 
In view of the fact that Robert earnestly seeks to 
hold Schramm liable for any deficiency, we deem 
the exact nature of his liability to be unimportant, 
for he would nevertheless be included among the 
class of "other obligors who owe a collateral duty to 
pay deficiencies." 
[2] [3] We then consider what is the effect of 
Robert's failure to give Schramm the requisite 
notice. Schramm urges that it amounts to a bar 
against any deficiency, but this is an issue that this 
court has yet to decide. The provision governing 
failure to comply with the U.C.C. notice 
requirements is found at 9-507(1) wherein it states, 
in pertinent part: "If the disposition has occurred 
the debtor ... has a right to recover from the secured 
party any loss caused by the failure to comply with 
the provisions of this part." There are three 
divergent views on the effect of this provision on 
deficiencies. 
One view is that since it does not mention 
deficiencies, they are not precluded. Some courts 
have held that 9-507(1) prescribes the sole penalty 
for the creditor's failure to give notice and does not 
shield the debtor from a deficiency judgment. *743 
See Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Howard, 75 
Misc.2d 181, 347 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y. City 
Ct.1973); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wollgast, 
11 Wash.App. 117, 521 P.2d 1191 (1974). 
The other extreme, the anti-deficiency view, 
decries recovery of a deficiency where the notice 
requirement was not met for the reason that it would 
permit a continuation of the evil which the U.C.C. 
sought to correct. This view stresses the loss of the 
owner's right of redemption through his loss of the 
opportunity to bid at the sale. Skeels v. Universal 
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F.Supp. 696 
(W.D.Pa.1963) (vacated on other grounds, 335 
F.2d 846 (3rd Cir.1964)). Another line of anti-
deficiency cases holds that strict compliance with the 
notice requirement is a condition precedent to a 
claim for a deficiency. Bank of Gering v. Glover, 
192 Neb. 575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974). 
Lastly, there is an intermediate view, termed the 
Arkansas Rule, holding that 9-507(1) is not an 
exclusive remedy, but that SDCL 57A-1-103 
incorporates prior principles of law and equity 
which remain effective. This rule indulges a 
rebuttable presumption that the collateral was worth 
at least the amount of the debt, thereby shifting to 
the creditor the burden of proving the amount that 
would reasonably have been obtained through a sale 
conducted according to law. Norton v. National 
Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 240 Ark. 143, 
398 S.W.2d 538 (1966). 
Our decision in First Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. 
Kehn Ranch, 394 N.W.2d 709 (S.D.1986), 
discussed the effect of failure to give notice of the 
sale of the collateral cattle at sale barns. [FN1] 
First, the majority noted that Kehns had waived 
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their right to receive prior notice of sale of 
collateral, because notice became an issue at trial 
and the jury found by special interrogatory that bank 
had failed to give reasonable notice. Next, the 
majority responded that 9-504(3) authorizes sale 
without notice of collateral of a type customarily 
sold on a recognized market, and that auction sale 
barns are a recognized market, thereby eliminating 
the requirement for notice. Obviously, Kehn Ranch 
is not authority for this case inasmuch as the 
collateral was not cattle, nor was it sold on a public 
market that would be recognized, even under the 
Kehn Ranch definition. It is, however, illustrative 
of a situation where the deficiency was not and 
could not have been created by the manner of sale. 
As noted in the dissent, "it is strikingly obvious that 
the large deficiency was created by the 
disappearance of approximately two-thirds of the 
collateral prior to Bank's repossession and not due 
to the sale of the remaining collateral." 394 
N.W.2d at 724. Similarly, in this case, undisputed 
testimony in the record would place the 1980 value 
of the collateral at the time it was seized by Robert 
in the amount of at least $30,100. 
FN1. For a discussion on the distinction between 
notice and commercially reasonable sale, see 
Richard Barnes, Field Warehousing Cattle and 
Their Sale on Recognized Markets, 9 J.Agric.Tax'n 
& L. 337-352 (1988). 
It is obvious that Robert improperly sought to 
gain for himself a huge windfall by his method of 
handling this sale. For that reason, it would be easy 
to say that the harshest of remedies should be 
applied against him and adopt the anti-deficiency 
view expressed above. Or we could adopt the other 
extreme and hold Robert, or any other creditor, free 
of the requirement that reasonable notice be given 
where appropriate under the code requirements. 
However, it is said that bad facts often create bad 
law and we prefer to step back and take a wider 
view of the result of our decision. In doing so, we 
choose to adopt the so-called Arkansas Rule and 
raise a rebuttable presumption that the value is equal 
to the amount of the debt. 
In this case, as previously noted, the undisputed 
testimony of Victor, the owner of the collateral, 
placed the value of the property at the time it was 
seized. Granted that there was a considerable period 
that elapsed between the seizure and the sale. Under 
the facts in this case, any further depreciation should 
not redond to the benefit of Robert and to the loss of 
Schramm or Victor. Even so, it appears *744 that 
there does exist a deficiency between the amount of 
principal and interest sought on the note and the 
value of the collateral seized. 
Schramm next urges that Robert is denied a 
deficiency judgment because the sale of the 
collateral was not "commercially reasonable." 9-
504(3) requires: "Disposition of the collateral may 
be by public or private proceedings and may be 
made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or 
other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and 
at any time and place and on any terms but every 
aspect of the disposition including the method, 
manner, time, place and terms must be commercially 
reasonable." We discussed the criteria for a 
commercially reasonable sale in First Bank v. 
Haberer Dairy & Farm Equipment, 412 N.W.2d 
866 (S.D.1987), wherein we adopted the following 
checklist identifying distinguishing characteristics of 
an acceptable auction sale: 
1. A sale at which the public, particularly 
including the knowledgeable trade public, is 
invited, by prior advertisement, to appear and bid 
for the collateral to be sold. 
2. If the collateral is goods, they should be 
available for inspection by prospective bidders 
before the sale. 
3. The advertisement should be published in at 
least one newspaper of general circulation, and 
perhaps appropriate trade publications, reasonably 
in advance of the time of sale to allow potential 
bidders to participate, and should provide a 
reasonable amount of information concerning the 
time and place of sale and the collateral to be sold. 
4. The goods must be offered and sold for cash to 
the highest responsible bidder; and bidders must 
know of other bids and be permitted to raise their 
bids. 
5. The place of sale, moreover, must be accessible 
to the general public; and the sale itself, if not 
conducted by one of the parties or a public 
official, must generally be under the direction of a 
licensed auctioneer. 
Id. at 871-2 (citing W. Davenport & D. Murray, 
Secured Transactions, § 6.05(b)(2), at 273-74). In 
Haberer Dairy we determined that the sales 
proceedings were commercially reasonable, so we 
did not discuss the remedy that would be available 
were they not so. 
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Just as in the preceding issue on notice, the 
U.C.C. provision for remedy for failure to sell in a 
commercially reasonable manner is likewise found 
in 9-507(1), which provides in pertinent part: 
If it is established that the secured party is not 
proceeding in accordance with the provisions of 
this part disposition may be ordered or restrained 
on appropriate terms and conditions. If the 
disposition has occurred the debtor or any person 
entitled to notification or whose security interest 
has been made known to the secured party prior to 
the disposition has a right to recover from the 
secured party any loss caused by a failure to 
comply with the provisions of this part. 
And, just as in the case of failure to give notice, 
courts seem to follow the middle of the road 
reasoning of the Arkansas Rule. 
[4] The failure to sell collateral in a commercially 
reasonable manner does not necessarily preclude the 
creditor from recovering a deficiency. 
'[Noncompliance with the statute gives rise to a 
presumption in favor of the debtor that the 
collateral was worth the amount of the outstanding 
debt at the time of the default and the debtor is 
freed from any deficiency unless the creditor 
proves that the fair market value of the collateral 
was no greater than the sales pricef.] ... [W]hen 
the creditor seeks a deficiency but has failed to 
sell the goods in a commercially reasonable 
manner, the debtor is entitled to be credited with 
the fair market value of the collateral rather than 
the actual sales price.' 
Ferrous Financial Services Co. v. Wagnon, 70 
Or.App. 285, 291, 689 P.2d 974, 978 (1984) (citing 
All-State Leasing v. Ochs, 42 Or.App. 319, 600 
P.2d 899 (1979)). 
In this case, the jury was instructed in the 
language of 9-504(3) and the Haberer Dairy 
checklist. They were further instructed that if they 
found that the sale *745 was not commercially 
reasonable, then they must find "that the obligation 
of Albert Schramm to pay the amount of the 
promissory note is discharged to the extent the sale 
proceeds were inadequate." Neither party raises any 
issue on appeal with regard to the propriety of the 
instructions. We do not find them objectionable 
under the theory of recovery espoused by the 
Oregon courts, which we deem to be appropriate for 
application in this state. 
[5] In both this issue and the preceding one, we 
find it difficult to review the propriety of the verdict 
because only a general verdict form was submitted 
to the jury. There were no interrogatories submitted 
with respect to Schramm's defenses of lack of 
notice, commercially unreasonable sale, and strict 
foreclosure. With respect to the first two, as we 
have discussed them, we are left with a dilemma. 
We must assume that the jury followed the court's 
instructions. Therefore, they either found that the 
statutory requirements were complied with or they 
applied the court's instruction and set off any loss to 
Schramm that they found to be due because of the 
violations, thereby reducing the claim for $80,000 
plus to the figure of $42,900. 
It is admitted that no notice of sale was given to 
Schramm. The sale procedures followed by Robert 
were pathetically short of complying with the 
Haberer Dairy checklist. Further, the bid was so far 
below the value of the property, that we can say as a 
matter of law that those provisions were violated. 
However, that does not mean that the jury verdict 
cannot stand. We have said that, "in a civil case, if 
a general verdict is handed down and the jury could 
have decided the case on two theories, one proper 
and one improper, the reviewing court will assume 
that it was decided on the proper theory." Mid-
America Marketing Corp. v. Dakota, Etc., 289 
N.W.2d 797, 799 (S.D.1980). Because the jury 
could have reached the verdict under the instruction 
and allowed for the inadequacies of the sale 
procedures, we must uphold it. 
[6] Lastly, we examine Schramm's argument that 
Robert, by his actions, had constructively elected 
the remedy of strict foreclosure and is thereby 
barred from recovering a deficiency judgment. 9-
505(2) provides for strict foreclosure, in pertinent 
part: 
[A] secured party in possession may, after default, 
propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of 
the obligation. Written notice of such proposal 
shall be sent to the debtorf.] ... In the absence of 
... written objection the secured party may retain 
the collateral in satisfaction of the debtor's 
obligation. 
Clearly, "a creditor's election of strict foreclosure 
prevents obtainment of a deficiency judgment." 
Haberer Dairy, 412 N.W.2d at 869. Because 
Robert denies that he elected strict foreclosure, and 
there clearly was no written notice of election, the 
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question then becomes whether Robert, by his 
actions, made a de facto election. We find that he 
did. 
Robert relies heavily on Haberer Dairy, wherein 
we held that the creditor (Bank) did not elect strict 
foreclosure to the exclusion of all other remedies. 
Instead, Bank availed itself of other remedies; 
namely, it sued on the debt and attempted to sell the 
collateral. Further, Bank notified debtors that it did 
not accept the collateral in full satisfaction of the 
debt. Id. at 870. 
Even though the trial court ruled that Bank was 
entitled to possession of the collateral, and Haberers 
executed a bill of sale transferring the collateral, 
Bank did not take possession until some eight 
months later. This delay was permitted by Bank to 
allow Haberer time to satisfy the judgment or obtain 
refinancing. An auction sale was conducted 
approximately six months after Bank took 
possession of the collateral and receipts were 
properly applied in satisfaction of Bank's judgment 
against the debtor. Id. at 868-69. 
We find this case to be factually distinguishable 
from Haberer Dairy for the following reasons: 
(1) Robert took and maintained exclusive control 
and possession of the collateral from time he 
purchased the note in July 1980; 
•746 (2) Robert continuously held the collateral 
on his property and told Victor not to remove it 
and to stay away; 
(3) It was not until over a year later, in August 
1981, that Robert filed suit to collect on the 
promissory note; and 
(4) Robert did not undertake the sale of the 
collateral until December 1984, some four and 
one half years after taking possession. 
Although Robert did not give written notice of his 
intention to exercise strict foreclosure, we deem that 
under the facts of this case Robert's actions operated 
as a de facto election of strict foreclosure. He is 
thereby barred from obtaining a deficiency 
judgment. 
We reverse the judgment and remand with 
instructions to enter judgment in favor of Schramm. 
All the Justices concur. 
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